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The Background 
 
Improving the private enforcement of competition law is one of the EU goals. Indeed, 
Regulation 1/2003
1
 confers competence to apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (which prohibit 
anticompetitive agreements and abuses of dominant position, respectively), in addition to 
the European Commission and national competition authorities, to national courts. Only the 
combination between public and private enforcements makes it possible to guarantee full 
compliance with these antitrust rules, which generate rights and obligations both for 
Member-states (MS) and individuals. They also have direct effect, , they can be invoked 
directly by individuals in national contexts, either against the State (direct vertical effect) or 
against other individuals (direct horizontal effect). Thus, the effective application of Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU presupposes not only the prevention and punishment of their 
infringement, but also the protection and compensation of the damages caused by that 
infringement to undertakings and consumers.  
 
1
 Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003, of 16 December 2002, on the implementation of the rules on competition 
laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The individuals’ right (including public authorities) to seek compensation for the harm 
caused to them by an infringement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, , to effective judicial
2
 
protection, was recognized for the first time, by the ECJ, in the  ruling
3
. However, 
before the Private Enforcement Directive
4
, EU law did not regulate this specific type of 
damages actions. Five years later, in the Manfredi
5
 ruling,  the ECJ ruled that, in the absence 
of EU rules, it was for the domestic legal system of each MS to prescribe the detailed rules 
governing the exercise of that right, 
6
. The need for such a link, between the infringement of competition 
law and the harm suffered, to seek compensation was subsequently confirmed by an ECJ 
ruling also called 
7
, in 2012. 
After almost a decade of deliberation, the Directive referred above was finally adopted, 
on 26 November 2014, with the purpose of ensuring an effective protection for anyone who 
has suffered harm caused by an infringement of the competition law
8
. It provides that, in 
compliance with the principles of effectiveness and equivalence, national rules and 
procedures relating to the exercise of claims for damages should (i) not render practically 
impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of the EU right to compensation and (ii) not be 
less favourable to the alleged injured parties than those governing similar actions for 
damages resulting from infringements of national law
9
. Among the several rules laid down 
in the Directive, it should also be stressed that, according to it, 
10
. In addition, it provides the rebuttable presumption (reversal 
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3
Of 20 September 2001, C-453/99. See SOFIA OLIVEIRA PAIS and ANNA PISZCZ, Package on Actions for 
Damages Based on Breaches of EU Competition Rules: Can One Size Fit All?, (Yearbook of Antitrust and 
Regulatory Studies 7, no. 10, 2014), 211. 
4
 Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and the Council, of 26 November 2014, on certain rules 
governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the 
Member States and of the European Union. 
5
 Of 13 July 2006, C-295/04 to C-298/04. 
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 See paragraph 64. 
7
 Of 6 November 2012, Case C‑199/11. 
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 See Recital 4 and Article 1(1). 
9
 See Article 4. 
10
 See Article 12. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
of the burden of proof) that cartels cause harm
11
. However, the Directive does not provide for 
anything regarding the causal link other than the following reference in the recitals: 
(…) 
12
. 
Between 2006 and 2018, the ECJ issued about six rulings deepening some of the above 
issues but, only in 2019, issued three important decisions on the private enforcement of 
competition law: 
13
, 
14
 and, more recently,  Very briefly and before we 
go deeper into the last one, is a game changer in terms of liability for damage 
caused by infringements of competition law. According to the ECJ, successor undertakings
15
 
assume the liability [the undertakings 
participating in the carter meanwhile dissolved] 
16
. , on the other hand, deals with the temporal scope of the Private 
Enforcement Directive
17
 and the compatibility of the time limit for bringing actions for 
damages as provided for in the Portuguese Civil Code
18
 with EU competition law and the 
principles of equivalence and effectiveness. For the ECJ, a 
19
 is contrary to the EU law. 
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1. The facts and the opinion of the Advocate General 
 
This ruling responds to a request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberster Gerichtshof 
(Austrian Supreme Court), in the context of a damage action presented inter alia by the Land 
Oberösterreich (the applicant) against five undertakings condemned for participating in a 
cartel on the market for the installation and maintenance of lifts and escalators. The cartel 
objective was securing for the favoured undertaking a higher price.  
The applicant did not claim as a direct or indirect customer of the products covered by 
the cartel but as a body granting subsidies. According to it, the increased costs connected 
with the installation of lifts, included in the overall costs, caused by the cartel led it to grant 
subsidies, in the form of promotional loans for the purpose of financing construction projects, 
in higher amounts than would have been the case in the absence of that cartel, depriving the 
applicant of the possibility to invested differently. On the other hand, the infringing 
undertakings and the Austrian courts of the first and last instance held that, according to the 
Austrian law, the damages suffered by the applicant did not present a sufficient connection 
with the purpose of the prohibition of anticompetitive agreements, which is to protected 
competition on the market affected by the cartel at issue. Accordingly, the Austrian Supreme 
Court questioned the ECJ whether those who are not active, as suppliers or customers, on the 
market affected by the anticompetitive agreement, can claim compensation for the damages 
they have indirectly suffered. 
The Advocate General (AG) Juliane Kokott starts by focusing the question as a problem 
of causality: is there a sufficiently direct causal link or is it a very remote injury whose 
compensation cannot reasonably be imposed on the cartel participants
20
?  
She points out that, notwithstanding the above-mentioned recital of the Private 
Enforcement Directive, as regards the application of the concept of causation be for the 
national legal systems (provided that the principles of equivalence and effectiveness are 
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respected), the issue at stake here is one aspect of the examination of causality which does 
not concern the modalities of application but rather the material assumptions of the right to 
compensation for damage caused by infringements of competition law. For the AG, the real 
question is whether Article 101 TFEU also confers on an undertaking (in this case, a public 
lender) who did not operate as a supplier or as a buyer on the market affected by the cartel 
the right to compensation for the damage it has suffered as a result of the cartel. That's why, 
for the AG, this is a matter of EU law (interpretation of the Treaties)
21
. 
As to whether there is a sufficiently direct causal link between the elevator cartel and the 
damage for which the complainant seeks compensation, the AG concluded that the 
relationship between the inflated price of the installed lifts and the percentage amount of 
each loan calculated to purchase them can be proven in each individual case. According to 
the AG, this case illustrates the diversity of damage which can be caused by anticompetitive 
behaviors and which is not limited to damage caused directly or indirectly to suppliers or 
buyers in a market affected by a cartel or an adjacent market, nor to damage occurring in 
the course of engaging in a profitable activity
22
. 
 
2. The ECJ ruling 
 
The ECJ began by recalling the above-mentioned case law, in particular as regards the 
direct effects of Article 101 TFEU on the legal sphere of individuals. It reaffirmed that its full 
effectiveness implies that any person may claim compensation for damage caused to it as a 
result of an infringement of competition rules
23
.  
In substance, the ECJ agreed with the AG in the sense that if the capability to claim for 
compensation were limited to suppliers and customers of the market affected by the cartel, 
this right would be compromised
24
. According to this ruling, 
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25
.  
Finally, the ECJ decided, in abstract, that even who is not acting as supplier or customer 
on the market affected by the cartel must be able to claim compensation for damage resulting 
from it, namely, whether it was obliged to grant subsidies which were higher than if that 
cartel had not existed and, consequently, was unable to use that difference more profitably. 
However, it is for the national court to determine the existence of such damage and its 
relationship with the cartel
26
. 
 
3. Conclusive remarks 
 
 has come to clarify that "who" and "where" do not matter provided that there is a 
causal link between the damage and the competition law infringement. The members of a 
cartel, for instance, are responsible for compensating for all the damages they cause
27
, 
irrespective of in whom and on which market they manifest themselves. In short, anyone has 
the right to be compensated. 
Furthermore, it points out that the assumptions of liability for breaches of EU competition 
rules are a matter of EU law
28
 and, as such, it is for the ECJ to examine, in a general 
perspective, whether they are fulfilled. On the other hand, judge if these conditions are 
satisfied in the specific case it for the national courts
29
. 
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Despite the undeniable relevance of this ruling for the private enforcement of competition 
law, it should be noted that the ECJ does not clarify which elements have to be fulfilled, in 
the concrete case, in order to be established a “causal relationship”30. The reluctance of the 
ECJ to go deeper, albeit in an abstract way, in the requirements for compensation allows the 
EU competition law to be applied, in a disparate manner, by MS. 
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